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Transportation is a crucial element in any economy. With such a large
portion of the United States' economy centered around transportation, an
efficient system of moving goods would be in the nation's best interest.
Competitive markets are the most effective mechanism for allocating
resources efficiently. An efficient transportation system, therefore, would be one
where competition among carriers is the norm.
Enormous infrastructure costs prohibit new railroads from entering the
market, and prevent existing railroads from competing with trucks for freight
transportation revenues. This paper focuses on the lack of competition in the
railroad industry and attempts to demonstrate why trains are a superior mode of
transportation than trucks. This paper will also show that increasing competition
in the railroad industry can reduce freight transportation rates, increase service
quality, reduce pollution, and reduce fossil fuel consumption. Nationalizing
railroad rights-of-way in the United States would significantly improve
competition in the transportation sector.
Before discussing nationalization as a socially desirable policy for railroad
rights-of-way, it is appropriate to first examine the competitive conditions that
exist in the railroad and trucking industries.
COMPETITION IN RAILROADlNG AND TRUCKING

Perhaps the best way to illustrate the lack of competition in the railroad
industry is by comparing it to the trucking industry. The goal in this section is to
illustrate the difference in competitiveness between trucks and railroads, which
will demonstrate the degree to which competition can be improved in railroads.
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Let us consider the number of buyers and sellers of freight transportation.
In 1990 the American Trucking Association reported 45,791 trucking firms in the
United States (American Trucking Association 1990, 10). In 1991 there were 342
railroad firms (Beier and Cross 1993, 8). These number have little meaning
without considering the volume of freight moved by each mode. For the same
respective years trucks moved 25 percent of all freight in the United States and
railroads moved 38 percent (Statistical Abstract of the United States 1995, 626).
In terms of competition, these numbers are quite telling. Over 45,000
trucking firms competed for 25 percent of the freight in the United States in one
year, while 38 percent of the freight was handled by 342 railroads in the next year.
Worse still, 83 percent of the rail cars loaded in 1991 were handled by the 14 Class I
carriers 1 (Beier and Cross 1993, 7) . This fact may lend support to those who argue
that railroads exert monopoly or oligopoly power (Schmidt, 1995 (?)).
The difference in barriers to entry and exit for trucks and trains are just as
extreme. The most obvious difference is in equipment costs. A new semi tractor
costs anywhere from $60,000 to $100,000 (White, 1996) and the average trailer cost
$20,000 to 30,000 (Harvey, 1996). In 1994 a new locomotive cost $2 million, and
rail cars ranged from $45,000 to $50,000 each (Kruglinski 1994, 12). These
differences are magnified by the fact that one semi tractor can reach its minimum
efficient scale 2 with just one trailer. A train, on the other hand, requires more

1

Class I railroads are defined as railroads with annual gross revenues of $253,700,000 or more
(Association of American Railroads, 1994, 3).
2
Minimum Efficient Scale is the smallest quantity of output at which a firm's long run average cost
is minimized (Mansfield, 1993, 312).
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than one car to reach its minimum efficient scale. Clearly it is more expensive to
buy new railroad equipment that trucking equipment.
A less obvious difference between starting a new trucking firm and a new
railroad firm is the cost of infrastructure. To begin moving freight by truck, a
firm does not need to sink millions of dollars into new highways and bridges.
Firms pay for existing roads and bridges through diesel and road use taxes. These
taxes are based on usage, i.e., how much fuel is consumed or how many miles are
traveled. These taxes are a variable cost to the trucking firm.
In theory, a new railroad firm would require new rights-of-way. In other
words, before a new firm could move a single train, that firm would have to
purchase land, build roadbeds, lay tracks, and install the necessary switches,
signals, and crossings. Constructing new rights-of-way presently costs about $1
million per mile (ENR 1993, 18).
In practice, new railroads do not build new rights-of-way. Many times a
Class I carrier will sell-off lines that do not meet minimum profit margins and a
new regional or local carrier will purchase these lines. Other times an existing
regional or local railroad will fail and new owners will buy the rights-of-way,
rolling stock, and facilities of the defunct company.
Data seem to support the claim that high infrastructure costs make starting
a new railroad much more difficult than starting a new trucking firm. Between
1980 and 1990, 27,746 trucking firms were created (American Trucking Association
1990, 10). One hundred forty-six railroads were created during the same period
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(Beier and Cross, 1993, 8). Enormous infrastructure costs are a barrier to firms
wishing to enter the railroad industry.
Trucks and trains both pay infrastructure costs, but the different nature of
the costs magnify the disparity in competitive conditions between the two.
Trucks pay for highways and bridges on a variable basis, while trains pay fixed
expenses for infrastructure. The costs associated with property taxes and building
rights-of-way remain constant throughout a particular year whether a train
moves over the tracks or not. Maintenance costs are somewhat fixed in the sense
that once the maintenance has been performed, those costs must be paid
regardless of the volume of traffic over the repaired line. Variable infrastructure
costs give trucks a bottom line advantage over trains; economic profits are
reached sooner for trucks because of the much lower fixed costs.
Trucking is clearly more intermodally competitive than railroading. This
competitiveness results in lower prices and better service for trucks compared to
railroads. Lower prices and better service results in freight being diverted to
trucks when trains can move the same loads more efficiently in terms of
resources.
Assuming that there is excess capacity on rail lines and that reallocating
resources through competition is desirable, it is logical to illustrate how altering
infrastructure ownership might improve competition among railroads.
Reducing or eliminating the barriers to entry-the high fixed costs of
infrastructure-in the railroad industry would increase competition. As the cost
of starting a railroad decreases, the number of individuals or organizations
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capable of financing a new railroad increases. If there are profits to be captured in
rail freight transportation, more railroads would be created, increasing
competition.
Let us now take up the issue of how to reduce or eliminate infrastructure
costs in railroading.
NA TIONAUZING RAILROAD RIGHTS-OF-WAY

Federal, state, and local governments work together to construct and
maintain highways in the United States. Gasoline, diesel, and road use taxes are
the primary source of financing for these highway expenditures. Federal and state
governments establish laws to regulate traffic over highways, and fund agencies
to enforce the laws. This system is the model for changing infrastructure
ownership and maintenance responsibility in the railroad industry.
The federal government would own all of the railroad rights-of-way in the
United States. The government would maintain existing trackage, construct new
trackage as needed, and coordinate railroad traffic across the nation. Private
companies would own and operate locomotives and cars with universal access to
all rail lines in the United States. This system would be financed by an access fee;
railroads would pay a tax to use the government-owned tracks based on the
number of ton-miles traveled and the quality of the track.
There are five major issues that must be considered to make
nationalization a viable policy option. The first issue is how to compensate
railroads for the loss of their largest asset: rights-of-way. One method would be to
determine a dollar value for an individual railroad's rights-of-way and then pay
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the firm that dollar amount (or some percentage of that amount) in return for
their rights-of-way3. This would complete the transaction immediately, and
would provide railroads with capital to improve rolling stock, switching yards,
and other facilities. The drawback is the enormous expenditures the government
would incur.
An alternative method of compensation would be to spread the acquisition
cost over time. Once a dollar value has been assigned to a railroad's rights-of-way,

•

this value could be split into yearly credits. These credits, plus some amount of
interest, would reduce the amount of access fees the railroad would pay the
g overnment.
To clarify this method, consider this example. Suppose that a railroad firm
owns 100 miles of trackage, for which the government decides to pay one million
dollars over twenty years at 5 percent interest. Further suppose that in the first
year of this arrangement, the same railroad accumulates $250,000 in access fees
that it must pay the government. If the government were to amortize the v alue
of the firm's trackage ($1 million) over 20 years and add the interest premium, the
railroad would owe $197,500 to the government in access fees for that year. That
lS,

$250,000- [1,000,000
20

3

X

(1 + .05n= $197,500 where t = the number of years

Purch asing the track would be n o small exp en se. The 110,425 miles of road own ed by Class I
railroads (Railroad Facts, 1994, p . 44) is valued a t over fifty-four billion d olla rs (Mood y's, 1995,
a27) .
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since the tracks became government property. The railroad firm would use this
formula to calculate its access fee credit each year for the length of the agreement
(20 years in this example).
The advantage of this amortization method is that it eliminates the upfront cost of buying rights-of-way from railroad firms. Additionally, the
government would generate revenues from the access fees in the first year of this
arrangement, although the credit would reduce these revenues. One major
concern with this proposal that must be addressed is the consequences of railroad
failure prior to receiving all the credits due.
The second issue is how to tax railroads for using rights-of-way. A simple
answer is to charge firms for the number of ton-miles moved over a certain
quality of track. One hundred-thirty pound rail (130 pounds per yard) is more
valuable and more expensive than 110-pound rail. Heavier rail lasts longer and
permits higher train speeds and rail car weights than lighter rail. It seems logical,
then, for firms to pay a higher tax per ton-mile for higher quality track and a
lower tax per ton-mile for lower quality track.
Assessing these varying tax rates would not be difficult. Trains are
(obviously) restricted to the rails, making it relatively simple to follow their
route. Knowing the exact tracks that a train uses would permit accurate taxation
for usage based on the quality of tracks.
An important aspect of the tax is that it must be equal to the marginal
social cost of using the tracks. Each time a train passes over a section of trackage
there is wear on that section. Over time the rails, ties, and ballast deteriorate to a

•
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point where repair is necessary. The marginal private cost would be equal to the
damage caused by each incident of use.
The true cost of maintaining rights-of-way must also take into account the
marginal social cost of use. As rail traffic increases line congestion increases,
causing delays. Each carrier using a particular line occupies a zone that includes
the actual section of track the train occupies plus space in front of and behind the
train. No other train may be in this zone at the same time. Coordinating these
zones may cause delays, and therefore costs, to other carriers wishing to use the
track.
When a line closes for repairs, each carrier responsible for wear on that line
inflicts costs on other carriers wishing to use the line. An efficient system of
taxation would include not only the marginal private cost of use, but also the
marginal social cost of use.
The third issue is how to transform existing rights-of-way into a functional
network that spans the nation so that every rail carrier has access to every line.
Presently tracks owned by different railroads are for the most part unconnected
(Flint, et. al. 1995, 328). Constructing links and switches between existing trackage
would be necessary. A nationwide system of train controls and monitoring
would be required to safely control traffic over this network and record track
usage for taxation.
A drawback to this proposal is that the initial cost of networking (building
links and switches and implementing nation-wide train controls) would be in
addition to yearly maintenance expenditures. If the access fee was set to recover
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the marginal social cost of trackage use, the initial networking costs would not be
included in the marginal cost calculation. Instead, networking costs would be a
fixed cost that would require a special appropriation from the government.
Up to this point we have discussed construction, maintenance, and traffic
control as the responsibility of the government but have neglected the labor
concerns implied. This is the fourth issue. There already exists a labor force
skilled in trackage construction, maintenance, and train control. The logical
solution is for private sector maintenance workers, signalmen, and switchmen to
become public sector employees.
There are two significant concerns with rail employees becoming
government employees. The first is that the unions representing the
maintenance workers and signalmen, the Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way
Employees and the Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen respectively, would have
virtually no bargaining power against the government. Switchmen would be
placed in an awkward position. The United Transportation Union (UTU), the
union to which they belong, would still have members who are not government
employees. The UTU would have bargaining power with the railroads, but not
the government.
The second concern deals with compensation. Rail workers presently
receive extra retirement benefits through the Railroad Retirement Act. Under
this act railroads must contribute 16.1 percent of each worker's salary to a
retirement account. This contribution is in addition to the standard 7.65 percent
payment to social security and another 4.9 percent of wages that match employee
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contributions (Flint, et. al. 1995, 329). The concern is whether or not these
retirement benefits will continue after railroad employees become public sector
employees.
The final issue deals with accountability for private trains moving over
publicly-owned rights-of-way. This situation is analogous to private trucks and
automobiles using the nation's highways. The government would likely require
some sort of licensing for locomotive engineers, just as truck drivers are required
to have a Commercial Driver's License. This would provide a minimum
competence of train engineers and aid in safety and credibility.
ECONOMIC AND ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTIFICATION

A nation-wide network of trackage would provide present and future
railroad carriers access to any shipper in the United States that is capable of
utilizing rail transportation. If any carrier has unrestricted access to a shipper,
that shipper has a choice of carrier with which it can contract its services. Once
shippers have a choice, carriers will be forced to compete with each other to win a
shipper's business. This competition can be in terms of rates, service, or some
other criteria.
Consider a utility company that burns coal to generate electricity. In many
cases a utility is served by one railroad which delivers coal to the plant (ENR 1993,
18). If only one railroad serves the facility, the utility has no choice among
carriers, and must agree to the terms and conditions of service established by the
railroad. If nationalization occurred and any carrier could use the rights-of-way
connected to the plant, the utility could choose a carrier based on price, service
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quality, or any other criteria. In other words, railroads would have to compete for
lucrative coal hauling contracts.
Nationalization would also increase the number of railroad carriers in the
United States. Since infrastructure costs are a significant barrier to entry for
prospective railroad firms, nationalization would eliminate this barrier and
reduce the cost of starting a new railroad. As start-up costs fall, the number of
firms capable of financing a new railroad would increase. Assuming there are
excess profits in railroad transportation, new firms would purchase the necessary
rolling stock and facilities and compete with existing railroad firms.
Competition among firms will increase as the number of firms willing to
serve a particular shipper increases-as both existing firms gain unrestricted access
and new firms enter the market. As a result, freight transportation rates will fall
until a new equilibrium emerges. After rates settle shippers will choose among
carriers based on the quality of service offered. Nationalization will therefore
reduce rail rates and improve service quality.
A 1993 study by Donald Harper and Philip Evers surveyed manufacturers
in Minnesota about their perceptions of railroad, truck, and intermodal freight
carriers. The authors found that respondents who use intermodal service
perceived railroads as more costly, less reliable, and much slower than trucks.
Intermodal users overall perceptions for railroads and trucks, on a scale of one to
five (l=poor, 3=average, S=excellent) were 2.50 and 4.17, respectively.
Manufacturers who did not use intermodal service indicated the same
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perceptions of price and service quality-they scored railroads 1.97 and trucks 4.08
(Harper and Evers 1993, 37-38).
Nationalization could provide a framework for reversing these negative
perceptions of railroads. One might expect that, as railroad rates decrease and
service quality increases, perceptions of railroads would change for the better. As
these perceptions improve the volume of freight moved by rail would increase.

Table 1
Preferred Mode of Freight Transportation when Comparing Price and Quality of
Service Between Railroad and Trucking Companies
Quality of Service
RR> Trucks

RR=Trucks

RR < Trucks

RR <Trucks

Train

Train

?

RR= Trucks

Train

?

Truck

RR> Trucks

?

Truck

Truck

p
r
1

C

e

13

Table 1 shows the relationship of price and quality of service between
trucks and trains. If a shipper learns that railroads would charge a lower price
than trucks, and that the quality of service offered by railroads is superior to
trucks, then the shipper would choose to transport its freight by railroad (top left).

If railroad rates were the same as trucking rates, but trucks offered better service,
the shipper would choose trucks (middle right).
As railroad rates decrease and service quality increases, it is likely that more
shippers would choose to move their freight by rail. In terms of Table 1, firms
would tend to migrate to the northeast. When the difference in price and quality
of service favor trucks (e.g., middle right), improvements in rail rates and service
would make trains a viable alternative (top right, middle middle, or top middle) .
Where the choice between trucks and trains is currently unclear (indicated by
"?"), firms would be compelled to choose trains as rail rates decreased and / or

service improved.
The economic benefits of competitive freight transportation are
compelling. Nationalizing railroad rights-of-way is certainly not the panacea that
a flat tax is, but many of the same ideas hold true. Shippers using rails would
realize cost savings through lower rates and service improvements if competition
between railroads forced rail rates to decline. These savings could be passed down
the value-added chain and result in lower prices for finished goods. It may also
be the case that cost savings could prompt some kind of investment by
manufacturers.
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It would be naive to think that competition in the railroad industry would
only affect railroads. As rail prices decline and service improves, trucks will be
forced to compete with trains for freight that can be moved by either mode.
Intermodal competition could drive trucking prices down, resulting in lower
prices for even more finished goods.
Lower prices for consumers is not the only social benefit from
nationalization. Shifting freight transportation from trucks to trains is also
environmentally desirable. A 1995 study found that trains were three times more
fuel efficient than trucks (Purchasing 1995, 52t and a 1989 report from the
Association of American Railroads indicated that trains could haul 2.76 more tonmiles per gallon of fuel than trucks (Wilner 1989, 23).
Several studies have found that trains cause less pollution than trucks. A
1984 study by the Radian Corporation for the Environmental Protection Agency

found that trucks produced eight times as many hydrocarbons, two and one-third
times as much carbon monoxide and nitrogen oxide, and nearly nine times as
much particulate matter as trains. In that year trains hauled 935 billion ton-miles
and trucks carried 620 billion ton-mil~s (Wilner 1989, 24). A study conducted for
APL Stacktrain Services in 1995 found that trucks emit ten times more particulate
matter and hydrocarbons as trains to move the same amount of freight. Trucks
also produce three times as much nitrogen oxide and carbon monoxide as trains
(Purchasing 1995, 52).

If the volume of freight moved in the United States remained constant,
nationalization would reduce pollution, measured in tons of emissions.

15

Shippers would be lured away from trucks by lower rates and improved service
offered by trains. As less freight moves by truck and more moves by rail,
hydrocarbon, particulate matter, carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide emissions
would be cut drastically. Since trains are more fuel efficient than trucks, the
amount of fossil fuel needed to move the constant amount of freight would also
decline.
The economic and environmental benefits of increased competition in
railroading are limitless. Competition, however, does not occur without causing
other problems. Let us now focus on several caveats of nationalization.
THE SHORTCOMINGS OF INCREASED COMPETITION THROUGH NATIONALIZATION

If freight is diverted from trucks to rails, one concern is that many truck
drivers may lose their jobs. This point is difficult to counter considering that one
double-stack intermodal train traveling across the United States eliminates
several days' work for up to 200 truck drivers. This brings up an important point,
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however. Although long-haul trucking may indeed decrease, short-haul trucking
would likely increase as a result of increased intermodal traffic4.
For a train to haul intermodal containers from a point of origin to a
destination, there must be trucks at both points. Trucks must take containers
from a shipper and deliver them to the rail yard to be loaded onto a train. After
the train reaches its destination, there must be trucks to take the containers from
the rail yard to their final destination. This local delivery to and from railroad
terminals is referred to as drayage (Candler, 1994, 73).
The drayage and rail portions of intermodal freight are, by definition,
complementary goods. As demand for intermodal rail service increases, demand
for local drayage will increase as well. Lower employment that would result from
decreased demand for long-hauls would be offset by increased demand for drayage
short-hauls. Whether or not the increase in demand for short-haul drivers will
completely offset the decrease in demand for long-haul drivers is difficult to say.
It is possible that some drivers would lose their jobs, although not nearly as many
as might otherwise be expected.
THE P OLITICAL FEASIBILITY OF NATIONALIZATION

The theory supporting nationalization is intuitively appealing . . In an era of
government down-sizing and public distrust of the government, however, such a
proposal may face serious political challenges. It is likely that many politicians
would be opposed to nationalizing railroad rights-of-way. Motor, air, and barge

4

In this case, inte rmodal traffic refers to freight moved from one point to anothe r using both trucks
and trains.
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carrier lobbying groups would certainly work to stop such a plan. There are
several reasons, however, why the present time may be the most favorable for
proposing nationalization.
High-speed rail is becoming a popular topic in Washington and elsewhere.
William Middleton noted that
" Amtrak is moving rapidly to complete the work needed between New York City and
Boston to convert the full Northeast Corridor, from Washington to Boston, to high speed
operation. New York State already has the Empire Corridor linking New York City with
Albany and Buffalo, and last year Congress designated five priority high speed corridors.
These include routes linking Washington, Richmond, Raleigh, and Charlotte, N .C.; a
Maimi-Orlando-Tampa route; a Midwest route linking Chicago to St. Louis, Detroit, and
Milwaukee; a California corridor extending from San Diego to Los Angeles, San Francisco,
and Sacramento via the San Joaquin Valley; and an international line linking Eugene,
Portland, Seattle, and Vancouver, B.C. Earlier this year the Clinton Administration
proposed legislation that would establish a five-year $1.3 billion program for high speed
rail development" (Middleton, 1993, 13).

Two projects Middleton mentioned are already under way: Florida Overland
Express will build a 319-mile high speed railway between Miami, Orlando, and
Tampa for $4.8 billion (Tomkins, 1996, 3) and Amtrak just announced that it will
purchase 18 high speed train sets to run on the Northeast Corridor (Tomkins,
1996, 3).
Most high-speed rail uses some sort of magnetic levitation on special
tracks. Other technology uses existing tracks modified with magnets to propel
trains (Design News, 1995, 13). If high-speed rail becomes a national priority, only
the federal government is capable of constructing a nation-wide system of special
tracks for high-speed trains. An editorial in The Economist agrees that
"[i]nstalling tracks and signalling is the sort of big infrastructure projects
governments do best" (The Economist, 1994, 18).

.
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Finally, an interesting scenario has emerged in Great Britain. British
railroads were previously owned and operated by the British Government. In
1993 Parliament voted to privatize the railroad industry with exception to rightsof-way (Anderson, 1995, 10). Now private companies make up 25 passenger train
operating units, five freight train units, and several rolling stock and
maintenance companies. The rights-of-way are still publicly owned by Railtrack
(Anderson, 1995, 10).
This may prove to be a valuable case study in mixed ownership of the rail
industry. While the means are very different, namely, starting from a completely
public system, the ends are the same-privately owned trains using public rightsof-way. Careful study of the developments in Britain may yield actual data for a
cost-benefit analysis of U.S. nationalization.
CONCLUSION

The high fixed costs of infrastructure preclude competitive markets in the
railroad industry. Eliminating fixed infrastructure costs and granting universal
access to all rail carriers would increase competition between existing carriers and
increase the number of carriers competing in the future. Increased competition
would likely yield lower rail rates, improved quality of rail service, and lower
motor carrier rates.
Nationalization can eliminate fixed infrastructure costs and stimulate
competition in the entire transportation sector. It can reduce pollution, reduce
fossil fuel consumption, reduce overall transportation expenditures in the U.S.,
and potentially increase productivity in the U.S. Nationalization of railroad

r
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rights-of-way is a viable proposition for improved economic performance, and
should be a national topic of debate.
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